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Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Introduction

Power begets regulation. As union strength grew during
recent decades, the federal laissez-faire policy of NorrisLaGuardia and the original Wagner Act gave way to increasingly tighter controls under Taft-Hartley and LandrumGriffin. Considering the favored position of economic efficiency in our national ethos, it is not surprising that a
significant portion of the new controls were direc~d at
union practices which were thought ·to·--impede--the fullest
utiiizationot"-employers' prc:.,~uctiv~_ resources. From time
to time, however, thoughtful observers have questioned
whether our legal regulation of union activity was properly attuned to the actual needs and economic power of
labor and management. 1 Put another way, the problem is
that not only does power beget regulation; too often, perhaps, the mere appearance of power begets regulation.
* I should like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Mr.
Robert M. Vercruysse, of the University of Michigan Law School
Class of 1968, in the preparation of this paper. I also must thank
the numerous participants in the Southwestern Legal Foundation's
Fourteenth Annual Institute on Labor Law who were so generous in
commenting on the empirical research project outlined in this paper,
and who were so quick to offer their aid to me in seeing the task
through.
1 See, e.g., Cox, "Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary
Analysis," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 252, 272 (1955); Brinker & Cullison,
"Secondary Boycotts in the United States Since 1947," 12 Lab. L.J.
397,399,403 (1961).
1
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I wish I could announce that I am going to supply a
definitive blueprint for constructing a rational system for
regulating union restrictive practices-union practices, that
is, which limit an employer's freedom in choosing his tools
and products, his production techniques, and the persons
with whom he will deal. Unhappily, all I can announce is the
start, rather than the completion, of a project aimed at shedding some light on the way the law does affect such union
restrictive practices, on the way it could affect them, and on
the way it should affect them. What I would like to share
with you is my initial, tentative thinking on the kinds of data
we need, and on the use we can make of the information once
we have assembled it. I would welcome suggestions on additional questions that should be asked, and opinions on the
relevance of this whole inquiry. To keep the discussion within
reasonably manageable proportions, I'm going to confine my
remarks to secondary boycotts, hot-cargo agreements, and the
antitrust implications of union behavior. Obviously, it
would be entirely appropriate to deal in addition with
jurisdictional disputes and featherbedding. Those topics are
omitted simply to avoid a total surrender to diffuseness.
To place the empirical data and inquiries in proper perspective, I will first provide a brief summary of the existing
law of secondary boycotts, hot-cargo, and antitrust, as it
applies to labor. I will then point out what I regard as the
principal unresolved ( or dubiously resolved) issues in each
of these areas, and indicate how I feel empirical data can
contribute to the resolution of these issues.

Secondary Boycotts
Section 8 (b) ( 4) ( B) 2 of the amended National Labor
Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
to induce a work stoppage to force any person "to cease
doing business with any other person." Read literally, that
2

61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(b) (4) (B).
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language could be construed as forbidding even the most
common garden variety "primary" strike, directed solely
against the particular employer with which a union has a
dispute, since such a strike is designed to force the primary employer to halt its dealings with other parties. Yet
clearly Congress did not seek to interfere with the "ordinary strike" or to diminish a union's traditional "right
to strike." 3 What Congress was out to stop in Taft-Hartley
was the so-called secondary boycott. 4 During the twenty
years since the passage of that Act, the Board's most difficult and persistent problem has been distinguishing between lawful primary and unlawful secondary activitybetween situations where the union's "sanctions bear . . .
upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute,"
and situations where they bear "upon some third party
who has no· concern" in the dispute. 5
The Geographical and the Semi-Literal Theories
Two quite different approaches to this question have
been emphasized by the Board at various times and in
various contexts. One I will label the "geographical approach," and the other the "semi-literal approach."
Under the geographical approach, favored by the Truman
Board, a union could appeal to employees of either primary
3

NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672-673
(1951); IUE Local 761 v. NLRB (General Blee. Co.), 366 U.S. 667,
672 (1961); S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 28 (1947);
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 58 (1947); 93
Cong. Rec. 3951 ( daily ed. Apr. 23, 1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
Section 13 of the amended NLRA, 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 163, provides:
"Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein,
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish
in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
4 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947); 93
Cong. Rec. 3954 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
5 Hand, J., in IBEW Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.
1950), aff'd 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
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or secondary employers not to enter or do work at the primary employer's own job site. 6 The NLRB reasoned that
"traditional primary strike action" had always included the
right "to induce and encourage third persons to cease doing
business with the picketed employer" and to "respect a
primary picket line at the Employer's premises." 7 The Supreme Court was thought to endorse this rationale as an
alternative ground for its decision in NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co. 8
The Eisenhower Board espoused what I have termed a
semi-literal reading of Section 8 (b) ( 4) (B). All direct appeals to secondary employees were prohibited; the only effects
on secondary employees that would be tolerated were
those which could be classified as merely "incidental" to an
appeal to primary employees. Primary situs picketing was
generally to be deemed lawful because the union "is thereby
permitted to bring pressure on the primary employer
through appeals to his own employees, and any effect
which such picketing may have on the employees of some
other employer is regarded as only incidental. " 9 On the
other hand, picketing at a secondary site was generally to
be deen1ed unlawful because it constituted a forbidden appeal to secondary employees. An "exception" was recognized to permit "picketing at the premises of secondary
en1ployers when there is no other way in which the union
6

Oil Workers Local 346 (Pure Oil Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949);
UE & UE Local 813 (Ryan Constr. Corp.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949);
Newspaper Deliverers' Union (Interborough News Co.), 90 N.L.R.B.
2135 (1950). The critical geographical factor was the place where
the services were scheduled to be performed, not where the appeal for
a work stoppage was made. In the case of picketing, of course, the
two geographical locations usually coincided, since unions ordinarily
picket at the site where they want work to be halted.
7

Oil Workers Local 346 (Pure Oil Co.), N. 6 supra at 318-319.
(Emphasis in the original.)
8
9

N. 3 supra.

Teamsters Local 657 (Southwestern Motor Trans.), 115 N.L.R.B.
981,983 (1956).
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can picket the primary employer's employees. " 10 To ensure
that any picketing at a secondary ( or common) site was
designed to reach only primary employees, with no more
than an incidental impact on secondary employees, the
NLRB required such picketing to be conducted in accordance with the well-known Moore Dry Dock 11 standards.

The Related Work Test
The "geographical" approach and the "semi-literal" approach collided in the General Electric case. 12 A union
called a strike at a large manufacturing plant and began
picketing all gates leading to the primary employer's premises.
One gate had been set aside for the sole use of the employees
of independent contractors. The contractors' employees performed a variety of tasks at the plant, including the construction of new buildings, repairing and retooling of new equipment, and general maintenance work. The union, in keeping
with the geographical theory, argued that picketing anywhere
at the primary employer's premises was lawful primary activity. The Board, however, following the semi-literal rationale, held the picketing unlawful. Since only the employees of independent contractors were allowed to use the
separate gate, the union's object in picketing there was "to
enmesh these employees of the netural employers in its dispute
with the Company." 13
10 Ibid. See also Brewery Drivers Local 67 (Washington Coca-Cola
Bottling Works), 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953), enforced 220 F.2d 380
(D.C. Cir. 1955).

Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 549
(1950). Picketing of a secondary employer's premises must:
(1) Be limited to times when the situs of dispute is located there;
(2) Be limited to times when the primary employer is engaged in
its normal business at the situs;
( 3) Be limited to places reasonably close to the situs; and
( 4) Clearly disclose that the dispute is with the primary employer.
11

12

IUB Local 761 v. NLRB (General Blee. Co.), N. 3 supra. _

IUB Local 761 (General Blee. Co.), 123 N.L.R.B. 1547, 15501551 (1959), enforced 278 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
13
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The Supreme Court rejected both approaches. Neither
the fact that the picketing was limited to the primary premises nor the fact that the picketing at the reserved gate
was patently addressed to secondary employees was considered controlling. Instead, said the Court, the "key to the
problem is found in the type of work that is being performed by those who use the separate gate." 14 The union
had no right to picket secondary employees "performing
tasks unconnected to the normal operations of the struck
employer," such as new construction work. But it could
picket employees making "regular plant deliveries" or engaging in "conventional maintenance work," since this was
part of the "traditional primary activity of appealing to neutral
employees whose tasks aid the employer's everyday operations."15
In effect, the Supreme Court in General Electric concluded that a union could lawfully impose an economic
"quarantine" on a primary employer. Such a quarantine
may encompass a total shutdown of the primary's normal
operations, including any work directly related to those
operations, whether performed by employees of the primary or by employees of another employer. Hi Even an appeal unabashedly directed to secondary employees, then,
may constitute primary activity under certain circumstances.
As it happened, the picketing in General Electric took
place at the primary employer's premises. In a subsequent
case, however, the Supreme Court declared flatly: "The
location of the picketing is an important but not decisive
14 IUE Local 761 v. NLRB, N. 3 supra, at 680. (Emphasis added.)
15 Id. at 680-682.
The most searching analysis of the General Elec. related work
test is found in Lesnick, "The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott,"
62 Colwn. L. Rev. 1363, 1385-1389, 1411-1430 (1962).
16

Regulation of Union Restrictive Practices

7

factor. " 17 The Court then proceeded to uphold picketing
on a neutral railroad's right-of-way aimed at halting deliveries to an adjacent manufacturing plant which was on
strike. Nevertheless, the picketing in this instance was
about as close to the primary premises as was feasible.
Thus it cannot be said with assurance that the related
work test has wholly superseded the geographical approach.

Clashing Theories in the Construction Industry
Certainly the NLRB does not think the related work
doctrine provides all the answers. Probably the most significant current issue regarding the primary-secondary
dichotomy concerns the possible applicability of the related work test in the construction industry. In Markwell
& Hartz, 18 a nonunion general contractor reserved two
gates at a construction project for the exclusive use of neutral subcontractors. The union picketed all gates with signs
declaring that the general contractor did not have a
union contract. After pondering the case for over a
year, the Board issued a three-to-two decision holding the
picketing a violation of Section 8 (b) ( 4) (B). The majority said it was i1n1naterial whether the work of the neutral subcontractors was related in some sense to the general contractor's normal operations. General Electric was
distinguished on the ground it "involved picketing at the
premises of a struck manufacturer," 19 while Markwell &
Hartz involved common situs picketing in the construction
industry. It therefore was governed by the Moore Dry
United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Carrier Corp.), 376 U.S. 492,
499 (1964).
17

Building & Constr. Trades Council (Markwell & Hartz, Inc.),
155 N.L.R.B. 319 (1965), enforced 66 L.R.R.M. 2712 (5th Cir.
1967). See also NLRB v. Nashville Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
66 L.R.R.M. 2294 (6th Cir. 1967).
18

19

155 N.L.R.B. at 324. (Emphasis in the original.)

8
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Dock20 requirements. Since the picketing at the gates set
aside for the neutral employees was not, under this analysis, reasonably close to the site of the primary dispute, it
was impermissible secondary activity.

In thus reasserting the "semi-literal" approach in common situs cases, and limiting the related work test to
appeals at primary premises, the majority placed principal
reliance on the· famous Denver Building Trades21 decision.
There the Supreme Court held that the general contractor
and the subcontractors on a construction project are to be
treated as separate employers, so that a union having a
dispute with one contractor could not picket all of them
by branding the entire job "unfair." For the majority in
Markwell, too much violence would have to be done to
Denver to conclude that all the subs on a construction job
are doing work connected to the regular operations of the
general.
The Markwell minority surely makes a strong point
when they argue the artificiality of excluding the related
work test from the construction industry. Some provisions
of the Act make a distinction between that industry and
other industries; Section 8 (b) ( 4) (B) does not. It would
seem, therefore, that the General Electric interpretation
of that section should govern picketing in the typical building trades situation, as well as picketing in the typical
manufacturing situation. I am not yet prepared, however,
to go all the way with the Markwell minority if they are
suggesting that all of the work of subcontractors is necessarily "related" in the GE sense to the normal operations
of the general contractor. True, the general is responsible
for the work of all the subs. And technically the Markwell
minority was able to distinguish Denver because, there,
2o

See N. 11 supra.

21 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(1951).
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a nonunion sub was the primary employer; obviously, it
is easier to contend that the work of all subs is related
to the general's ( as in Markwell), than to contend that
the work of the general and all the other subs is related to
that of one particular sub ( as in Denver). Arguably, appeals to both plumbers and electricians employed by subs
would be proper when the general contractor is the primary party, but not when either the plumbing or electrical
sub is the primary.
Despite this logical consistency, I am troubled by the
feeling that total acceptance of the Markwell minority's
apparent position would do too much violence to Denver.
Denver may be a woefully inadequate reflection of the
realities of the construction industry, but it now enjoys
rather specific congressional endorsement, 22 and can hardly
be overturned except by legislation. Saying that all work
performed by subs on a construction project is "related"
to the general's normal operations would, I take it,
enable picketing of their employees, even though the general had subcontracted the entire job and was using no
employees of its own at all. For me, this cuts too much
against Denver's underlying notion that the general and
the subs on a construction project are "independent contractors," and that Congress has established the policy of
"shielding unoffending employers and others fron1 pressures
in controversies not their own." 23
I would prefer to see the related work test applied in the
construction industry in such a way that the "normal,
everyday operations" of the primary employer would be
defined in terms of the functions of the primary's employees. A union's appeals for help would be confined to those
secondary employees immediately assisting in the primary
See, e.g., H. Con£. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38
(1959).
22

NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, N. 21 supra,
at 692.
23

10
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e1nployees' tasks, for example, by hoisting building materials to those at work on an upper story. This approach
would seem n1ore faithful to the principle that a union, as
part of traditional pri111ary activity, should be allowed
to try to perfect the "ordinary strike." 24 Cessation of hoisting operations by secondary employees would be a natural
concomitant of a strike which was successful in removing
prjn1ary en1ployees fro1n the upper story. 25
Employers will probably object that once the picket
line goes up, no matter how narrowly circumscribed the
stated appeal, the whole union-111anned portion of the job
will be shut down. But this is a problen1 in legal administration, not different in kind fron1 the one the NLRB has
always confronted in applying the Moore Dry Dock
standards. Undoubtedly there is massive hypocrisy in much
building trades picketing, and perhaps the Board should be
more rigorous in holding unions responsible for the work
stoppages they cause, regardless of their technical compliance with the Moore require1nents. That does not mean,
however, that the related work test should be dismissed as
totally alien to the construction industry. An even-handed
application of law requires that it should be employed in this,
as 111 other industries, to gauge the legality of union appeals. Adjustments can be made, if necessary, to take account of peculiar circumstances in the building trades.

The Use and Abuse of the Secondary Boycott
Federal legislation banning the secondary boycott in one
form or another has now been in effect for twenty years.
What has been its in1pact? Has it achieved its stated goals?
See N. 3 supra.
25 For an elaboration of the thesis that appeals should be permitted
to those secondary employees whose work would be rendered superfluous or impossible in the face of an effective strike by primary employees, see Lesnick, N. 16 supra, at 1411-1430. But Professor Lesnick
apparently thinks building trades unions could draw little comfort
from this theory.
24

Regulation of Union Restrictive Practices

11

Has it caused more harm than good? A few years ago two
University of Oklahoma scholars conducted a study of 100
boycott cases reaching the NLRB between 1947 and 1958.
They found that 42 percent of the boycotts were for organizational purposes, and that "the infliction of harm on secondary
employers was negligible." 26 They concluded: "If a system of
collective bargaining is to be preferred to individual bargaining, then perhaps additional legal support should be provided
to aid organization." 27 I don't know what these writers
meant by "negligible" injury to secondary employers, and
I am doubtful whether they have given proper weight to all
the policies behind the regulation of secondary boycotts.
But I am in full accord that a sound assessment of this
legislation calls for such empirical inquiries.
Acting on this premise, I have undertaken a preliminary examination of 107 cases involving alleged violations
of Sections 8 (b) ( 4) (A} and (B) and 8 ( e) ,28 decided by
the NLRB between May 1, 1965, and August 31, 1967. In
ninety-nine of these cases, the Board found one or more
violations. The following are various analytical breakdowns
of the ninety-nine cases where charges were sustained.
Industries Affected

No. Cases
Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Trucking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Longshoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

Newspapers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

All others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Brinker & Cullison, N. 1 supra at 403.
21 Ibid.
26

28 Section 8 ( e) of the NLRA prohibits so-called hot-cargo agreements; it will be discussed in the next section. Section 8(b) (4) (A)
outlaws strikes or other coercion to compel an employer to enter into
a forbidden hot-cargo arrangement.

Institute on Labor Law

12

Union Objective
No. Cases
Organization or recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Contract dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Work assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Work protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Area standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Charging Party
No. Cases
Primary employer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Union of primary employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Secondary employer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Union of secondary employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Both primary and secondary employers . . . . . . 4
Unidentified employer associations . . . . . . . . . 2
Independent employer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Unidentified individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Damage Sustained29
No. Cases
By secondary en1ployer
Substantial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moderate .......................... .
Minimal ........................... .
Undetermined ...................... .
By primary employer
Substantial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moderate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Minimal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Undetermined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46
13
35
5
65
4
27
3

The estimates of damage are based on delays in operation caused
by the secondary activity. If the delay was more than seven days, the
damage is classified as "substantial"; if three to seven days, "moderate"; if two days or less, "minimal." These are rough approximations
at best. In many instances, an employer faced with a work stoppage
at one project might be able to shift men temporarily to another job
29
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A number of conclusions, as well as a number of suggestions for more intensive investigation, emerge from
these figures. First, the secondary boycott is essentially a
construction industry phenomenon. The building trades account for over 70 percent of all violations. If the Teamsters are added in, only 15 percent of the secondary boycotts in my sainple are left for the unions in all other industries combined. This certainly underscores the importance of the struggle to overrule Denver Building Trades
and to permit common situs picketing. If that decision is
as faulty as is often clain1ed, in its failure to categorize the
general contractor and the subcontractors on a construction project as "economic allies," there is little doubt it
represents, quantitatively, one of the major inequities of
the statute. 30
Like the Oklaho1na study, n1y survey indicates that a
large proportion of secondary boycotts is used for organizational purposes. My figures suggest, indeed, that over
three-fifths of all boycotts have this objective. But I am
not ready to conclude, for this reason alone, that the restrictions on the boycott should be loosened. Against
this evidence of union need must be set the evidence of
damage caused by secondary boycotts to primary employers, secondary en1ployers, and the public generally. The
Oklahon1a study concluded that the injury to neutral parties was "negligible." My own preliminary inquiry is not
quite so sanguine, although it does indicate that primary
and avoid any significant loss in the ultimate accounting. On the other
hand, losses might be much higher were it not for existing statutory
controls. I hope eventually to obtain more precise calculations of the
damage sustained by primary and secondary parties.
At one point the Eisenhower Administration supported legislation
to overrule Denver. See S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 503 (1959).
Cf. H. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 702( c) (1959), as reported.
The proposal ran afoul of parliamentary technicalities at the time the
Landrum-Griffin Act was passed, and now employer opposition has
hardened against it. For an academic appraisal, see Lesnick, N. 16
supra at 1425.
30
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employers have a larger stake than secondary employers in the
enforcement of the secondary boycott provisions of the Act.
But even if third parties not privy to a dispute are little inconvenienced by a boycott, this does not automatically mean that
the statute is betraying its purpose. Protection of the innocent
"neutral" is plainly the most appealing quality of anti-boycott
laws. Yet it is evident that the proponents of such legislation
were also concerned about the plight of the primary employer
who is subjected to pressures emanating from outside his work
place, regardless of whether his own employees desire union representation. 31 In any event, if it could be established
that unions have a pressing need to use the secondary boycott for organizational purposes, and that neutrals suffer
only small hurt from it, Congress might be forced to a
much more discriminating judgment than any rendered
heretofore on the availability of this particular economic
weapon.
Hot-Cargo Agreements
The Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959 added Section
8 ( e) 32 to the National Labor Relations Act to proscribe
so-called hot-cargo agreements. In tenns, this provision
forbids union-employer agreements whereby an employer
commits itself to "cease doing business" with any other
person. The announced purpose of Section 8 ( e) was to plug
a loophole in the preexisting statutory restrictions on secondary boycotts, so as to include in the prohibition what
n1ight be described as uncoerced boycotts or boycotts by
contract. 33
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947); 93
Cong. Rec. 3954 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft);
H. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 ( 1959); 105 Cong. Rec.
14195 ( daily ed., Aug. 11, 1959) (remarks of Rep. Griffin).
31

32

73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e).

See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959);
105 Cong. Rec. 16413 (daily ed., Sept. 3, 1959) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy); 105 Cong. Rec. 14195 (daily ed., Aug. 11, 1959) (remarks
of Rep. Griffin).
33
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Subcontracting Clauses
Section 8 ( e) at once raises the same basic question as
Section 8 (b) ( 4) (B), namely, how can lawful primary conduct be distinguished from unlawful secondary conduct.
Literally, the conventional clause in many labor contracts
forbidding the subcontracting of work out of the bargaining unit is an agreement on the part of the en1ployer not to
do business with some other person. Yet that is only one
side of the coin. The obverse is that nothing could seem
more primary than the protection of the job content of the
employees in a given unit. The NLRB, in an early decision on Section 8 ( e), sustained an absolute ban on subcontracting. 34
More difficulty is encountered when the anti-subcontracting provision is conditional, or when it is designed to
recapture work formerly performed by unit employees.
Since this subject is treated in detail in another session of
this conference, I will content myself with the barest sketch
of the present state of the law. A subcontracting clause
has been upheld which restricted subcontracting to employers maintaining the same or better wage standards, on
the ground this removed the economic incentive for contracting out. 35 A clause was also sustained which required
all work of a certain type to be done by unit employees,
even though this resulted in the disruption of the employer's relations with other parties who had taken over the
work in question. 36 In each instance, the principal concern
of the contract provision was deemed to be the working
34

Minnesota Milk Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1314 (1961).

Teamsters Locals 413 & 728 v. NLRB (Patton Warehouse, Inc.
& Brown Trans. Co.), 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied
379 U.S. 916 (1964).
35

36 Teamsters

Local 710 v. NLRB (Wilson & Co.), 335 F.2d 709
(D.C. Cir. 1964); Teamsters Local 107 (S & E McCormick), 159
N.L.R.B. No. 1, 62 L.R.R.M. 1224 (1966), vacated and remanded
65 L.R.R.M. 3107 (3d Cir. 1967).

16
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conditions in the primary unit, with any effect on outsiders
being merely incidental.
Work Preservation and Product Boycotts

Perhaps the most troublesome issue in this area is posed
when a union, in seeking to retain or recapture work traditionally done in the unit, secures a clause which in effect
prevents the employer from utilizing a particular product.
Once more, work preservation is the union's rallying cry,
but the situation presents in its starkest form the picture of
an employer compelled to "boycott" an item it wants to use
or install.
In National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v.
NLRB, 37 the carpenters union obtained the agreement of a
general contractor not to handle precut or prefitted doors
on its projects. The cutting and fitting of doors were tasks
traditionally performed by the carpenters at the jobsite.
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, held the
"will not handle" clause did not violate Section 8 ( e) . J ustice Brennan, for the majority, pointed out that Section
8 ( e) "closely tracks" the provision which is now Section
8 (b) ( 4) (B), and that "just as the latter . . . did not
reach employees' activity to pressure their employer to
preserve for themselves work traditionally done by them,
§ 8 ( e) does not prohibit agreements made and maintained
for that purpose." 38 Four justices dissented, arguing that
a "product boycott" like that in the instant case was one
of the "precise evils" Congress sought to reach in enacting
Section 8 ( e) .

Swords, Shields, and Changing Technology
National Woodwork leaves several important questions
unanswered. Justice Harlan, the swing vote in the case,
pinpointed one when he emphasized in his concurrence
37
38

386 U.S. 612 ( 1967).

Id. at 635. See also Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v.
NLRB, 386 U.S. 664 (1967).
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that the carpenters were only trying to preserve work traditionally done by them, and not to acquire new work not
previously theirs. In Justice Brennan's phrase, the "will-nothandle" clause was being used merely as a shield, and not
as a sword. Justice Harlan seen1ed to hint that his reaction
might have been different had he confronted a sword.
Simply as an exercise in logic, it is not easy to distinguish the two situations in terms of Section 8 ( e) .39
Whether old or new work is at issue, the matter would
seem to involve "the labor relations of the contracting
employer vis-a-vis his own employees." 40 That is the Supreme Court's avowed touchstone for primary activity. But
strict logic may not control here. Lurking in the background, as Justice Harlan's opinion indicates, are the problems of a changing technology. According to conventional
teaching, it is the functjon of Congress, and not of the
Court, to accommodate labor policy to the economic demands of our industrial society. At this point, I care less
about who performs the operation than about having it
performed with some sureness of touch.
I do not think we really know how restrictive devices
like the "will-not-handle" clause in National Woodwork
affect the productivity of the economy. What information
is available, however, suggests the harm may be somewhat
exaggerated in the popular mind. A decade ago, Professors Haber and Levinson of the University of Michigan
published a classic study of unions and productivity in the
construction industry. Their survey covered sixteen cities
39 In certain circumstances, however, the effort to capture new
work might well run afoul of Section 8 (b) ( 4) (D), the jurisdictional
dispute provision.
40 National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, N. 37 supra at 645.
If the question reserved by Justice Harlan is resolved against the
unions, there is a further refinement to consider. How is the line to
be drawn between "old" and "new" work? If an entirely new and
different process or product is introduced in place of an old one,
may the employees who handled the displaced operation lay claim to
the substitute? Is this work preservation or work acquisition?
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in the eastern half of the country. They found that the
various trades accounted for the following percentages of
the labor costs of housing: 41
Percentage of Labor Costs of Housing, By Trade
Trade
Percentage
Carpentry and brickwork . . . . . . . . .
65-7 5 %
Painting .. ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10%
Mechanical trades . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8-10 %
Lathing and plastering . . . . . . . . . . .
4-5 %
Excavating and cement work . . . . . .
5%
Glazing, tile setting, roofing, and
others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.5 % or less each

Although National Woodwork itself instills some skepticism about the continuing reliability of the conclusion,
Haber and Levinson reported little opposition, or at least
little effective opposition, to innovations in tools, materials, and prefabrication among carpenters, bricklayers, lathers and plasterers, and excavators and cement workers. 42
Restrictions on new techniques were concentrated in painting, the mechanical trades, and glazing. These three trades
together represent only about 20 percent of on-site labor
costs, and the effect of their make-work practices on labor
expenditures was calculated as follows: 43
Effect of Restrictive Practices on Labor Costs in Housing
Trade
Percentage Increase in
Percentage
Costs of Particular Trade Increase in
Total Labor
Costs
Painting
25-30%
2.5-3.0%
Mechanical trades
20-25%
2.0%
Glazing
Up to 100% (?)
.5%
Haber & Levinson, Labor Relations and Productivity in the
Building Trades 191-192 (Bureau of Indus. Relations, U. Mich. 1956).
1956).
41

42

Id. at 107-121, 135-138, 192.

43

Id. at 121-132, 138-146, 192-193.
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Haber and Levinson summed up their findings with the
statement: "The complete elimination of union rules regarding new techniques holds forth the prospect of a reduction of about 5 percent of such labor costs. " 44
Anyone who has attended many debates on secondary
boycotts and hot cargo has doubtless been regaled by hairraising tales about the atrocities perpetrated in the glazing
trade-usually, for some reason, around Chicago. Seldom,
if ever, are we informed that we are talking about a potential saving of at most one-half of one percent of total
labor costs. Frankly, now, I don't know how exercised I
should be about the addition of a seemingly wasteful .5
percent-or even 5 percent, to cite the estimated figure for
all trades-to the wages paid in building a house. I would
like the labor economists to tell me how valid the HaberLevinson conclusions remain today. I would like some more
information about the prognosis of make-work devicesare they essentially temporary expedients to tide over a
trade faced with massive unemployment following the sudden introduction of a revolutionary labor-saving technique,
or are they malignancies that, once imbedded, can be excised only through drastic surgery? Then, after that enlightenment, I would like to brood a bit about the weight that
must be assigned the humane, noneconomic values of collective bargaining in any statutory equation. Only at that
juncture would I feel reasonably confident in tendering my
own prescription for regulating secondary boycotts and
hot-cargo arrangements. The only thing I am confident
about now is that the starting point should be an awareness
of how union restrictive practices actually operate across
the broad spectrum of industry-and not just how they operate in the glazing trade on the outskirts of Chicago.

The Right of Control
Another issue left unresolved by the Supreme Court's
decision in National Woodwork is the Board's "right of
44

Id. at 250.
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control" doctrine. The doctrine applies this way. A union
secures from an employer a standard work preservation
clause, valid under Section 8 ( e). Subsequently, the employer contracts to do a job for a third party, and, in violation of its prior agreement with the union, undertakes to
install a prefabricated product which eliminates the need
for certain operations covered by the work preservation
provision. The union strikes the employer in protest against
the loss of work. The NLRB holds such a strike a violation of Section 8 (b) ( 4) (B), on the ground that at the time
it occurs the employer does not have the "right of control"
over the work in dispute. 45
I could better understand the Board's reasoning if it were
limited to situations where the union had not obtained ( or
sought) the work protection agreement until after the employer had lost the right of control by making a conflicting
commitment to a third person. But as it stands, the problem
seems to me simply a modern variation on the old case of
the farmer who sold the same cow to two buyers. Of course,
the employer no longer has the power to dispose of the
work, but he gave it up knowingly, in breach of his con-:tract, and it hardly seems proper to punish the union for
his wrongdoing. 46
Try as I will, I can think of no light which empirical data
could throw on the Board's right-of-control test. I just have
4 5 Plumbers Locals 455 & 34 (American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n), 154
N.L.R.B. 285 (1965), enforced in part and remanded in part 366
F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1966), on remand 167 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 66
L.R.R.M. 1098 (1967). See also Longshoremen Local 1066 (Wiggin
Terminals, Inc.), 137 N.L.R.B. 45 (1962); Plumbers Local 5 (Arthur
Venneri Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 828 (1962), enforced 321 F.2d 366
(D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 921 (1963); Longshoremen
Local 1694 (Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs), 137 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1962),
enforced 331 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1964).
46 For a more extensive critique of the Board's approach, see Lesnick, "Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA
§§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e)," 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000, 1036-1039' (1965).
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to let it go as one of the more striking examples of the
deficiencies of overly refined deductive analysis.

Antitrust and Labor Relations
After lying relatively dormant for almost two decades,
antitrust law as a regulator of labor relations again moved
to the center of the stage with the Supreme Court's Pennington41 and Jewel Tea48 decisions of 1965. I will first set
forth in summary fashion my reading of these opinions,
then indicate a few of the unanswered questions they have
left us, and lastly outline some of the data I consider relevant in charting the course of antitrust law in the field of
labor relations.
Pennington and Jewel Tea

Pennington held that a union "forfeits" its antitrust "exemption" when it is "clearly shown" that it has agreed with
one group of employers "to impose a certain wage scale on
other bargaining units." 49 Moreover, a union was said to be
"liable" under the Sherman Act if it becomes a party to an
employer conspiracy to eliminate competitors, even though
the union's role is limited to securing certain wages, hours,
or working conditions from the other employers.

This analysis, as elaborated in Justice White's majority
opinion, suggests a distinction between the union's loss of
antitrust immunity and its commission of a substantive violation. so Does this mean an agreement affecting other bargaining units merely removes the exemption, without necessarily resulting in a per se violation? If so, what added ele47
48

United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).

United Mine Workers v. Pennington, N. 47 supra at 665.
so See also Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., N. 48 supra
.at 689.
49
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ments must be shown to establish an offense? The Supreme
Court long ago declared that only "unreasonable" restraints
on trade run afoul of the Sherman Act. 51 If persuasive
grounds can be presented, the courts could well find in the
"rule of reason" sufficient warrant for considerable flexibility in dealing with labor contracts having extra-unit implications ( such as "most favored nation" clauses) . A substantive violation might require a "predatory intent," a
definite "purpose" to impede or destroy business competitors. The trial court on the ren1and in Pennington, in effect,
so held. 52
Jewel Tea dealt with a quite different situation. A butchers' union entered into a multi-employer contract containing a provision that meat departments would not be operated after 6 P.M. The union then sought to co1npel a separate grocery chain to agree to the same restriction. As
viewed by a majority of the Supreme Court, the problem in
essence was one of characterization: did the clause involve
wages, hours, or working conditions, legitimate subjects of
collective bargaining, or did it constitute a forbidden restraint on the product n1arket?

The Court split three ways, with three Justices in each
group. Justice White, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice
Brennan found that the marketing hours restriction, which
in effect defined the butchers' working hours and their job
content, was "intin1ately related" to labor conditions. Thus
the union's effort to secure the provision through arm'slength bargaining in pursuit of its own labor policies, and
not in furtherance of a union-employer conspiracy, was
exen1pt under the Shern1an Act. Justices Goldberg, Harlan,
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 ( 1911). Cf. Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (trading rules for
commodity exchanges) .
51

52

Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
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and Stewart concurred for the same reasons that led them
to dissent in Pennington. They accepted the union argument that agreements dealing with mandatory subjects of
bargaining are wholly outside the antitrust laws. Justices
Douglas, Black, and Clark dissented in Jewel Tea on the
ground that the operating hours limitation was an obvious
restraint on the product market, and was not needed to fix
employees' working hours. The multi-employer collective
agreement itself was considered sufficient to show an illegal
union-employer conspiracy to impose the marketing hours
restriction on the holdout chain.
A critical problem spotlighted by Jewel Tea is what
standard should be used to distinguish between agreements
properly concerned with wages, hours, and other components of the labor market, and agreements improperly concerned with the product market. Unlike the wage contract
in Pennington, which in and of itself involved a restraint
on the labor market only, the contract in Jewel Tea involved a restraint on both the labor market ( a defining of
the butchers' working hours and their job content), and on
the product market ( a restriction on the hours for selling
fresh meat) . Justice White assumed that if the agreement
had dealt directly with the product 1narket only ( a fixing of
a price schedule for the meat, for example), with any benefit to the employees merely an indirect consequence, it
would not have been immune to the antitrust laws. What
saved the Jewel Tea provision in his eyes was that the
marketing-hours restriction was "intimately related" to
wages, hours, and working conditions. The trial court had
found as a fact that self-service meat sales were unfeasible;
therefore, a limitation on operating hours was necessary to
preserve the butchers' jobs and working hours.
In sustaining the agreen1ent's exemption from the antitrust laws in this situation, Justice White at one point
seemed to be "weighing" the employees' interests in labor
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standards against the admittedly adverse effects on product
competition. 53 Apparently for Justice White, any showing
of an "immediate and legitimate" employee concern would
be enough to tip the scales to the side of the union. Consumers receive short shrift. My reaction to this approach is
rather 1nixed. First, any reintroduction of the pre-NorrisLaGuardia judicial technique of "balancing" the social
plusses and minuses of union objectives must be viewed
with some apprehension. But, second, if such balancing is
to be indulged in, it should not be just an annchair exercise.
A dozen years ago Archibald Cox observed that there was
"no reliable infonnation on the extent or economic in1portance of union efforts to shelter employers from competition in the product market." 54 As well as I can tell,
things stand today about as they stood then. If Pennington
and Jewel Tea are to presage a resurgence of labor antitrust litigation ( so far there has been surprisingly little) , 55
it would indeed be unfortunate for the courts to have to
resolve son1e of the legal issues posed without more education on the economic realities.

It 111ight be objected that price fixing is price fixing and
111arket control is market control, and we don't need empirical data on the extent of these practices to know we
want to stamp them out whenever we encounter them in
any given case. I would have two con1n1ents. First, the procompetitive philosophy of antitrust is antithetical to the
anti-con1petitive philosophy of collective bargaining, and
53

Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., N. 48 supra at 691.

54

Cox, N. 1 supra at 272.

55 The

most important post-Pennington decision is Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 372 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted
36 U.S. Law Week 3143 (Oct. 9, 1967). The Second Circuit held
that union regulations establishing minimum compensation levels for
orchestra leaders were violative of the Sherman Act, even though the
leaders were allegedly performing in competition with members.
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the latter can be expected to suffer if antitrust regulation
becomes pervasive in labor-management relations. Second,
as Pennington itself demonstrates, it will be excruciatingly
difficult in many individual instances to draw the correct
inference about union and employer objectives. The inevitable tendency of a union's contracts, for example, is to
standardize wage levels; it is but a step for a jury to conclude that a particular scale has been set "too high" for the
purpose of eliminating inefficient producers. Before we run
the risk of jeopardizing collective bargaining through an increasing admixture of antitrust, and through a judicial "balancing" of employee and consumer interests, I think we
could profit from all the guidance which empirical research
can provide about the need for this major innovation.
A Prospectus for Research

In the earlier portions of this paper dealing with secondary boycotts and hot cargo, I attempted to provide at least
some tentative empirical data of the type I think pertinent
in evaluating legal controls of union restrictive practices.
There is such a dearth of information on the actual or likely
practical impact of existing or proposed labor-antitrust
regulation that I'm going to confine myself here to suggesting some guidelines for the kinds of investigation I feel
should be undertaken.
For many persons, the mention of unions and antitrust
in the same breath immediately conjures up visions of
eradicating industry-wide bargaining, or multi-employer
bargaining, or even industry-wide unionization. I'm ready,
however, to dismiss this line of inquiry as too unpromising.
While I find data lacking on many relevant subjects, the
areas of industry-wide bargaining and multi-employer bargaining have been sufficiently explored by such respected
labor economists as Clark Kerr, Richard Lester, Edward
Robie, and John Dunlop to satisfy me that these bargain-
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ing arrangements are economically more beneficial than
harmful. 56
The need, as I see it, is for extensive scrutiny of union
efforts to limit output, fix prices, or restrict the market to
which employers have access. There is at least some reputable economic thinking that such restrictive practices exist
in sufficient quantity to have a significant effect on the
economy. 57 And surely these are the union activities most
suitable for antitrust regulation, if any unilateral union action is to be subject to such regulation. 58 Moreover, as we
move into an era in which the service trades represent a
constantly growing segment of the labor force, we will be
faced with more and more situations in which the setting
of wages and working conditions will become the equiva-

Kerr, "Collective Bargaining on the Pacific Coast," 64 Monthly
Lab. Rev. 650 (1947); Kerr & Fisher, "Multiple-Employer Bargaining: The San Francisco Experience," in Lester & Shister, eds., Insights Into Labor Issues 25 (Macmillan 1948); Lester & Robie, Wages
Under National and Regional Collective Bargaining: Experience in
Seven Industries (Princeton 1946); Lester, "Economic Aspects of
Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining, Wage Levels and Price Levels,"
in Proceedings of the Conference on Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining 46 (Pennsylvania 1949); Dunlop, "Economic Aspects of
Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining, Allocation of the Labor Force,"
in Proceedings of the Conference on Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining 34 (Pennsylvania 1949); Reynolds, Labor Economics and
Labor Relations 162-167 ( 4th ed., Prentice-Hall 1964).
56

57 See, e.g., Rees, The Economics of Trade Unions 140-142 (Chicago 1962).

58 See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws 297-299 (1955); Cox, N. 1 supra at 272
et seq.; Independent Study Group, The Public Interest in National
Labor Policy 138-139 (Committee for Economic Development 1961).
At the present time, of course, unions are subject to antitrust sanctions
if they join an employer conspiracy to restrain trade in the product
market. Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945);
Sovern, "Some Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and Allen
Bradley," 13 Lab. L.J. 957, 962 (1962).
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lent, for all practical purposes, of the setting of prices and
consumer "product" standards. 59
Just how widespread are union-imposed operating restraints of the sort symbolized by Jewel Tea? Is the introduction of new products and services substantially slowed
as a result of union opposition, Are employers in large numbers, denied entry to the market place? Those and similar
questions are the ones I'd like answered before judgment is
passed on the propriety of a stiffer dose of antitrust in labor
relations. 60 They won't be easy questions to answer, and
labor economists, rather than lawyers, will probably have
to take the lead in the inquiry. I will simply hazard the
prediction that the job will demand a great deal of time
and money-and that, if done right, it will be well worth
the price.
Conclusion

Too often, we construct our labor laws according to an
abstract model that is but a poor imitation of reality. The
actual power relationships between unions and employers
are distorted. Important differences between one industry
and another are glossed over or ignored. Sententiousness
usurps the function of economic analysis. We must, it seems
to me, put aside our neat conceptualistic structure and begin grubbing for some of the elusive facts of industrial life.
Only then can we hope to secure the raw material for fashioning a regulatory instrument that will be responsive to
the real needs of labor, management, and the public.
Compare Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, N. 55 supra,
with Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 ( 1959).
59

In any event, I'd prefer to see any extension of antitrust thinking
in this area take the form of amendments to the labor relations laws
rather than amendments to the antitrust laws as such. This view apparently is shared, or at least not disputed, by the authorities cited
in N. 58 supra.
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